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Abstract Prominent roles for general attention resources
are posited in many models of working memory, but the
manner in which these can be allocated differs between
models or is not sufficiently specified. We varied the
payoffs for correct responses in two temporally-overlapping
recognition tasks, a visual array comparison task and a tone
sequence comparison task. In the critical conditions, an
increase in reward for one task corresponded to a decrease
in reward for the concurrent task, but memory load
remained constant. Our results show patterns of interference
consistent with a trade-off between the tasks, suggesting
that a shared resource can be flexibly divided, rather than
only fully allotted to either of the tasks. Our findings
support a role for a domain-general resource in models of
working memory, and furthermore suggest that this
resource is flexibly divisible.
Keywords working memory.attention.change detection.
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Introduction
Working memory is a complex system that holds informa-
tion while it is temporarily available to be processed further
and manipulated (Baddeley, 2007;B a d d e l e y&H i t c h ,
1974;C o w a n ,1988, 2005; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram,
1960;M i y a k e&S h a h ,1999). A key issue is whether
information in working memory is held entirely in
separate modules that do not affect one another (e.g.,
Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Logie, 1999), or whether it is
held at least partly in a common faculty in which
information from various sources share limited resources
(e.g., Baddeley, 2001;C o w a n ,2001, 2005). In order to
determine which view is correct, one must explore the
nature of interference between concurrent working memory
loads imposed in different domains, such as the visual-spatial
and acoustic-verbal domains.
Such interference is often observed, but there are still
controversies concerning the nature of that interference.
One issue has been whether cross-domain interference
can be obtained at all. At least some experiments have
s h o w ns u c hi n t e r f e r e n c e( M o r e y&C o w a n ,2004, 2005;
Saults & Cowan, 2007; Stevanovski & Jolicoeur, 2007;
Vergauwe, Barrouillet, & Camos, 2010), though others have
shown little or no such interference (Allport, Antonis, &
Reynolds,1972; Cocchini, Logie, Della Sala, MacPherson, &
Baddeley, 2002; Logie, Zucco, & Baddeley, 1990). We will
reexamine this issue in a manner complementary to previous
studies.
A second issue is whether the individual can choose
the proportions of working memory resources to allocate
to the two tasks, or whether that proportion is immutable.
If attention is involved in working memory storage and
maintenance, the allocation of that resource should be at
least partly voluntary. That is true regardless of the
particular model of working memory. If one accepts a
modular conception of working memory (e.g., Baddeley,
1986), attention governing the central executive could
regulate how many stimuli held in each domain-specific
buffer are rehearsed or refreshed; at least the initiation
of a rehearsal cycle seems to require some attention
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DOI 10.3758/s13414-010-0031-4(Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1984). If one accepts a less
modular conception of working memory (e.g., Cowan, 1988,
2005), attention might determine how many stimuli from
each domain are represented in a common, central store.
In contrast to both of these approaches, though, some
varieties of a modular approach seem to exclude a role of
domain-general attention (e.g., Cocchini et al., 2002;
Wickens, 1984, 2002). According to such approaches, the
amount of interference between working memory tasks
might depend solely on the amount of overlap between the
stimuli to be remembered in the two tasks; the primary
source of interference is the competition between similar
stimuli for access to their appropriate storage module. First,
we aim to confirm that some cross-domain interference
indeed occurs, using motivational incentives as an oper-
ationalization of volitional attention. Second, assuming
some degree of interference is observed, we shall have
new information to restrict the plausible features of any
shared resource, whether that resource is considered a
process manager (like the central executive) or a shared
store (like the focus of attention or episodic buffer).
Currently, the descriptions of these resources are so vague
that it is not necessarily clear how they might be shared
between two competing tasks. Is a general working
memory resource shared only in the sense that auditory-
verbal or visual-spatial tasks may each use it, but without
sharing it concurrently? Alternatively, perhaps a shared
resource may be arbitrarily divided and deployed to assist
in the maintenance of two kinds of memoranda. If so, how
fine can this division be? The results we report provide new
limitations to be applied to existing models of domain-
general resources in working memory.
The present study
Theoretically, there are at least two methods to examine
cross-domain interference between two working memory
tasks. In the first method, the difficulty of at least one of the
tasks is manipulated and evidence for an effect on
performance of the other task is examined. This is the
method used by all the dual-task studies noted above, and
has certainly proved a fruitful strategy for research. Here,
we instead use a second method for examining dual-task
performance that is well regarded but not often used: to
manipulate the relative payoffs or attention allocation
instructions of the two tasks instead of task difficulty
(Gopher & Donchin, 1986; Navon & Gopher, 1979;
Sperling & Dosher, 1986; for more recent applications,
see Alvarez, Horowitz, Arsenio, DiMase, & Wolfe, 2005;
Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996). The
logic of these two approaches is similar; as either the
difficulty of, or incentive to, one task increases, perfor-
mance on the other task should decrease if a shared
resource is needed to carry out both tasks at once. In the
trade-offs approach, if a common attentional resource is
needed in both tasks, then emphasizing one task should
result in an improvement in that task at the expense of
performance on the other task.
Evidence from difficulty manipulations has been mixed,
with some researchers observing cross-domain dual-task
costs but many observing few or no costs. However, the
pattern of performance observed in dual-task studies
manipulating difficulty can be difficult to interpret clearly.
Where cross-domain dual tasks costs have been observed,
increasing difficulty of Task A in one domain results in
decreased performance on both Task A and concurrent Task
B in some other domain. In these cases, the cost to Task B
must reflect some cross-domain resource sharing, but the
cost to Task A might reflect either domain-specific
resource limitations, domain-general limitations, or some
combination of these. Expected trade-offs in a scenario in
which reward is manipulated instead of difficulty are
more straightforward in some respects. First, because the
paradigm encourages selective resource-sharing, one
expects performance on one task to improve at the
expense of the other, rather than performance on both to
decrease. Second, any change to either task with
changing reward level must be attributed to whatever
resource they share. The extent to which trade-offs are
observed under this circumstance might reflect the extent to
which individuals can determine which task to prioritize, or to
selectively attend.
Manipulating payoffs is therefore a method whose
success depends on the availability of a reasonable estimate
of storage capacity. Such estimates have been advocated by
Pashler (1988), as well as by Cowan (2001) and Cowan
et al. (2005), and variations of this estimate have been used
successfully in a profusion of studies of working memory
based on the visual comparison procedure of Phillips
(1974), reintroduced by Luck and Vogel (1997;e . g . ,
Alvarez & Cavanaugh, 2004; Gold, Wilk, McMahon,
Buchanan, & Luck, 2003; Rouder et al., 2008;T o d d&
Marois, 2004, 2005; Xu & Chun, 2006; also with a
sequential visual memory task, Kumar & Jiang, 2005). One
benefit of a capacity metric is that it leads to a clear
expectation for the form of a trade-off function, whereas in
many situations, this function must be determined empiri-
cally (Alvarez et al., 2005). With a capacity measure for each
task, the trade-off should be linear if the shared resource has
a constant capacity; when the payoffs change, an increase in
X u n i t si nc a p a c i t yf o rT a s k1s h o u l da l w a y sp r o d u c ea
decrease in C×Xunits for capacity in Task 2. This
expectation follows from the simple physical metaphor in
which a maintaining an item takes up a certain proportion of
the shared resources.
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if the units differ between tasks or the tasks differ in the
amount of domain-specific mnemonic capacity. Impor-
tantly, in our design, estimates of storage capacity are
meant as dependent variables, calculated to provide
comparable measures between two different tasks, and it
need not be assumed that C = 1. Certainly, a trade-off
between tasks, which in this case would manifest itself as a
reduction in capacity estimates of the less rewarded task
and a corresponding increase in capacity estimates of the
more rewarded task, could arise due to dependence on any
kind of shared general resource, whether that resource is
thought to function as a memory store (e.g., Baddeley
2001; Cowan’s focus of attention, 2005) or as mnemonic
processing (e.g., Baddeley’s central executive, 1986). In
either case, estimates of storage capacity would change
with the proportion of reward given for each task, albeit for
different reasons. Observing any trade-off would further
confirm sharing of some domain-general resource, as in the
working memory models of Baddeley and Cowan, in
opposition to the notion that mental resources are predom-
inantly separate on several dimensions (Wickens, 2002).
Furthermore, the characteristics of any observed trade-off
might improve the specificity with which a domain-general
resource can be described, which is essential for making
further progress in understanding any relationship between
attention and memory.
We used a manipulation of financial payoffs in three
dual-task working memory experiments. In different
conditions of each experiment, different allocation
instructions were used while the number of memoranda
in each task was held constant. The concurrent tasks,
tone sequence comparison and visual array comparison,
were the same across all conditions within each exper-
iment, and challenging levels of difficulty were chosen
so that the tasks were unlikely to be accomplished using
only automatically-activatedm e m o r yb u f f e r s .I nd e s i g n -
ing these tasks, we endeavored to create two tasks that
were as equivalent as possible except with respect to the
stimulus domain of the memoranda, so that capacity
could be estimated in the same manner for both tasks.
The critical difference between conditions in each
experiment was the level of reward assigned to correct
responses in each task. In most conditions, the total
potential reward was fixed, and what distinguished the
conditions was how the reward was divided between the
two tasks. An exception was two conditions in Experiment 2
that were included to ensure that attention allocation, rather
than total effort expended, explained performance differences
between conditions.
By using multiple payoff conditions we can also
determine how fine-grained the attention allocation process
can be. For example, it might be that participants have only
two possible attentional states: attend to a task or ignore it.
Alternatively, participants might be able to split attention
between the two tasks. If participants can allocate some
proportion of attention to both tasks, how flexible can this
allocation be? Note that this flexibility might occur in terms
of either the splitting of attention on an individual trial, or
in terms of some proportion of trials with attention to each
task; we cannot distinguish between those possibilities, as
indeed no other prior study has been able to do.
We report three similar experiments, all contributing to a
comprehensive Bayesian analysis. In these studies, we
included various combinations of reward levels but, overall,
we wanted to assess whether reward levels affect perfor-
mance, and if so, how flexible this effect might be. Using
traditional inference techniques, this question might be
addressed with ANOVAs, in which we test for any effect of
the reward variable, and subsequent post-hoc tests, by
which we test (assuming a main effect of the reward
variable) how finely a shared resource may be divided by
comparing each level of reward. A simple main effect of
the reward variable would indicate that some shared
resource can be split between the concurrent tasks. Differ-
encesbetweenpreciselevelsofrewardintheexpecteddirection
(i.e., no reward < low reward < high reward < full reward)
could be taken as evidence that fine, rather than all-or-none,
allocation of this resource is possible. However, an enormous
sample might be required to detect significant differences
between each level of reward and, moreover, a flexible division
of resources does not depend on observing significant mean
differences between each reward level. Rather, the joint
orderings of reward level conditions in each task might
be evaluated. With a Bayesian analysis, the question of
interest can be addressed more powerfully and more
directly. Specifically, we constructed a nested series of
comparisons of theoretically possible joint orderings,
supposing different levels of divisibility in a shared
attention resource. For each comparison, we calculated a
Bayes factor, and compared these Bayes factors to
evaluate the evidence for each theoretical level of
divisible attention. Because we observed similar effects
of reward across all three experiments, it is best to
combine the results of all three of our studies into one
comprehensive analysis, which is possible and advanta-
geous when using hierarchical estimation techniques. We
therefore present the method for all experiments together
so that, in turn, we can consider the results of all
experiments together.
General method
Because we wanted to compare cross-modal performance on
comparable visual-spatial and auditory tasks, we combined a
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with a visual array comparison task (cf. Luck & Vogel, 1997;
Phillips, 1974). Both tasks were two-alternative forced-
choice recognition tasks. In both tasks, stimuli were selected
randomly on each trial from comparably-sized samples. The
tone stimuli might not be continuously rehearsed with the
passive phonological loop as a verbal list might be, which is
important inasmuch as we aimed to measure dual-task
interference in a central resource. To further ensure that
such rehearsal was not effective for either type of stimulus,
participants engaged in articulatory suppression by repeating
the word “the” throughout each of the three experiments, a
standard precaution taken in many visual change detection
experiments.
In our procedure, a sample visual array and a sample
tone sequence were presented one after another, in either
order. Then, a test array and a test tone sequence were
presented, with a response required for each task. Partic-
ipants indicated whether the two arrays were identical or
differed in the color of one square and whether the two tone
sequences were identical or differed in the pitch of one
tone. This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 1, for one of the
two orders of the stimuli that were used. The order of
presentation of the sets of stimuli to be remembered always
matched the order of the tests.
In order to make the visual array and tone sequence
recognition tasks as equivalent as possible, we re-presented
an entire array and sequence at test. The task was to
indicate whether one item had changed. This whole-array
procedure is commonly employed (cf. Cowan et al., 2005;
Luck & Vogel, 1997; Saults & Cowan, 2007;V o g e l ,
McCullough, & Machizawa, 2005), although it is also
common to employ probes with only one item present or
with only one item marked as possibly having changed (for
a comparison of whole- and partial-report tests, see
Wheeler & Treisman, 2002). We chose to use whole-
report probes to allow us to probe memory for the
assignment of items to spatial or temporal positions; this
was necessary because probing the simple presence versus
absence of a single item leads to poor results for tone
sequences, which rely on relational information. We
therefore used the whole-report method for both tasks, to
ensure that the tasks were as similar as possible except for
the stimulus domain of the memoranda. For this variation
of change detection task, Pashler (1988) capacity estimate
is the appropriate metric, because it was constructed for the
procedure in which the entire array is reproduced at test
with a possible change in one item, whereas Cowan (2001)
estimate was constructed for a single-item probe procedure.
Both estimates combine hits and false alarms in a principled
manner. The difference in assumptions between Pashler’s
estimate and Cowan’s is reflected after dropping redundant
terms by dividing Cowan’s estimate by the correct rejection
rate.
 
+
Fixation, 1000 ms
Sample visual array, 500 ms
Sample tone sequence: 250
ms/tone
Test visual array plus
prompt screen for
same/different response
Test tone sequence,
250 ms/tone, plus
prompt for
same/different
response
Fig. 1 A graphic depiction of the basic procedure for the visual-array-
first presentation order in all experiments. An alternative order in
which the tone sequence was presented before the visual array at both
study and test was also used. The correct visual response in this case is
“different”. Feedback was given for both tasks after response to the
second task was registered
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Participants
Participants, recruited from the University of Missouri
introductory psychology pool, received partial course credit
fortakingpartinthestudyandamonetaryrewardofupto$10
for correct responses. Participants earned an average of $8.24
(range: $6.61–9.87). Three were excluded due to chance
accuracy in at least one condition for each task and three
others were excluded due to computer failure errors, leaving a
final n = 32 (17 men, 15 women). Each was randomly
assigned to one of the two stimulus orders shown in Fig. 1.
Apparatus and stimuli
The experiment was controlled with E-Prime (Schneider,
Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002). We chose to use arrays of
8 squares and sequences of 6 tones in an effort to equate
task accuracies on the basis of pilot results. Visual stimuli
were displayed on a 17-inch (43.18 cm) monitor set to a
resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels. Each visual array included
eight 20 × 20-pixel squares scattered at randomly chosen
locations at least 2° apart within a 270 × 201-pixel area in
the center of the screen. The centermost point was excluded
as a possible location. Assuming a viewing distance of
50 cm, each square occupied approximately 2° of visual
angle. Each square color was selected randomly with
replacement from a set of seven easily discriminable colors
including red, blue, green, yellow, black, white, and violet,
which appeared against a neutral gray background. The first
array (sample) and the second array (test) were either
identical or differed in the color of only one square. Tone
stimuli were presented via headphones at approximately
78 dB. Each tone sequence contained six tones played at a
rate of four per second. Tones were drawn randomly
without replacement from a set of nine pitches (87, 174,
266, 348, 529, 696, 788, 880, and 972 Hz). On trials in
which one tone changed, the change could be to a pitch that
was new to the sequence or a repeat of a tone that occurred
at another position in the sequence. Since these pitches did
not comprise a typical Western musical scale and the order
was randomly determined, the sequences did not sound
melodic.
Procedure
After completing eight supervised practice trials, each
participant performed five randomly-ordered blocks of
experimental trials. In each 40-trial block, values were
assigned to accuracy on the visual array and tone discrim-
inations such that the total value of correct responses on
any single trial equaled 1,000 points. The allocation of
points to each task was always explicit. Correct responses
to each array were worth 1,000, 750, 500, 250 or 0 points
each in different blocks, with the reward for the tones set to
1,000 minus the reward for the arrays. Pilot testing of this
procedure indicated that participants were more motivated
when each trial was worth a large number of points, vague
with respect to the actual amount of money each response
was worth, rather than a description of the small amount of
real money each correct response was worth (rather like the
reward structure for playing arcade games). Participants
knew that they could earn money by making accurate
responses, and were specifically instructed that points
corresponded to money and that by accumulating as many
points as they could, they would earn the most pay.
Participants viewed two visual arrays and were asked to
judge whether the arrays were the same or different. If the
arrays differed, only the color of one square changed.
Likewise, participants heard two tone sequences and were
asked to judge whether the sequences were the same or
different. If the sequences differed, they differed only in the
frequency of one tone. Half of all the test arrays and
sequences differed from the sample stimuli. The visual and
tone stimuli were independent; change in one type of
stimulus did not increase or decrease the likelihood of
change in the other stimulus. Participants were instructed to
repeat the word “the” softly (2 repetitions/s) during each
trial in order to suppress verbal rehearsal of the stimuli, and
an experimenter monitored their suppression throughout the
session. Articulatory suppression began when the fixation
cross appeared, and continued at least until the first
response prompt appeared; participants were not prevented
from suppressing throughout the trial if they preferred, as
many did. No participant included in the analysis needed to
be reminded to suppress articulation more than once after
the practice session ended.
The trial events presented in Fig. 1 were similar for all
subsequent experiments (which differed slightly in timing,
assignment of orders to individuals, and levels of reward
conditions). The critical segments of a trial included
presentation of a sample stimulus in Task 1 (visual array
or tone sequence), sample stimulus in Task 2, test stimulus
and query display in Task 1 (requiring a same–different
response), and test stimulus and query display in Task 2
(requiring another same–different response). At the end of
each trial, feedback was provided for both tasks.
Because a response occurred during either the array or
tone inter-stimulus interval depending on the task order, it
was not possible to perfectly equate the duration of each
task, but it was possible to make them similar. For the
visual array comparison task, the onsets of the sample and
test arrays were separated by 2,100 ms when the array task
began first, and 2,100 ms plus response time to the test tone
sequence when the array task began second. For the tone
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each sequence were separated by 3,100 ms when the tone
task began first and 3,700 ms plus response time to the test
array when the tone task began second. (In Experiment 3,
when task order was manipulated within-participants, these
timings were made as similar as possible.)
Experiment 2
This experiment differed from the first in the inclusion of
control trials intended to test whether it could be the
absolute, rather than relative, reward assigned to each task
that mattered.
Participants
Nine men and 23 women participated in Experiment 2, for
partial course credit and up to $10, depending on
performance. Monetary reward ranged from $7.11 to
$9.41, with a mean reward of $8.27. The data of two
participants were removed from the analysis due to chance
performance on at least one task, leaving a final n = 30.
Apparatus and stimuli
All equipment used in Experiment 2 was the same as that
used in Experiment 1. Visual array and tone sequence
stimuli were constructed as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Experiment 2 included two conditions in which reward for
correct completion of each task was equal instead of
relative. In the low reward condition, participants earned
250 points for each correct response to either the visual-
array or the tone-sequence task. In the high reward
condition, participants earned 750 points for each correct
response to either task. We also included four relative
reward conditions, in which each task was worth 0, 250,
750, or 1,000 points, with the total possible reward on each
trial equal to 1,000 points. Each combination of reward
levels was presented in randomly-ordered blocks of 40
trials each. All other aspects of Experiment 2, including the
between-subject order manipulation, and selection and
duration of stimuli remained as they were in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3
This experiment differed from the others in that the order of
visual and auditory memoranda within a trial was varied
within participants.
Participants
After excluding 2 subjects for chance performance in at
least one of the tasks, Experiment 3 included 16 men and
8 women, a total n = 24. Reward for a 1-h experimental
session ranged from $6.54 to $9.21, with a mean of $7.88.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Equipment and tasks used in Experiment 3 were the same
as that used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Procedure
Participants completed one set of trials in which the
sample array was presented first, followed by the sample
tone sequence, test visual array, and test tone sequence,
and one set in which the sample tone sequence occurred
first, followed by the sample visual array, test tone
sequence, and test visual array. Order of these blocks
was counterbalanced.
Within each block, relative reward conditions were
presented in randomly-ordered blocks. The sum of potential
rewards for each trial always equaled 1,000 points, and
each task could be worth 0, 500, or 1,000 points, making
three reward conditions in each task-order block, or six
blocks total per experimental session. Participants first
completed an unpaid practice session of eight trials. After
the first three blocks of trials, participants were required to
take a break lasting at least 1 min. After this break,
participants completed eight more unpaid practice trials
before continuing with the final three blocks of the session.
Each experimental session included 192 paid trials,
amounting to 32 trials per reward condition block.
Regardless of task order, the interval between the offset
of the first task’s stimuli and the appearance of the test
stimuli for the first task was always 3,250 ms. This interval
for the second task varied depending on participant’s
response to the first stimulus but for each case measured
3,250 ms plus response time to the other task’st e s t
stimulus.
Results
Throughout this paper, inferential results will be reported in
terms of capacity estimates rather than proportions correct.
These estimates allow a concrete understanding of how
many visual items cost how many auditory items in
performance as the attention allocation changes, as
explained in the introduction.
We calculated capacity estimates using Pashler (1988)
formula, which is more appropriate for use with whole-report
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2005). Ifachangeoccurred,onlyoneitemchanged,butnocue
was given to limit the decision to one particular square in the
test array or one tone in the test sequence. That is the situation
motivating Pashler’s estimate. The relevant formula is
k ¼ Sh   f ðÞ = 1   f ðÞ ð 1Þ
where k is the number of items loaded into working memory,
S is the set size in the modality tested, h is hits, the proportion
of changes correctly detected, and f is false alarms, the
proportion of non-changing displays incorrectly judged to
have changed. The formula is based on the assumption that a
change in the stimuli can be detected on k/S of the trials in
which there is a change and, if no change is detected, the
participant nevertheless guesses “change” on some proportion
g of the remaining trials. This proportion g is the same for
change and no-change trials and thus drops out of the final
formula. In our studies, because the number of items in each
display is larger than the set size at which k typically reaches
asymptote (see Cowan, 2001), we take k to reflect the limit in
capacity. Calculating capacity estimates allowed a direct
comparison between tasks, even though more to-be-
remembered items were presented in the visual task than
the auditory task.
Mean hit and correct rejection rates (from which false
alarm rates were derived) for each task in each experiment
can be found in Tables 1, 2 and 3. These rates were used to
calculate estimates of memory capacity, also given in these
Tables. Because the reward manipulation produced similar
results across experiments, conditions were combined
across experiments in statistical analyses.
1
Our analyses focus on two questions: first, are the effects
of reward consistent with a flexible division of resources?
To answer this question, we considered data from all three
experiments combined. In the combined analysis, we
included all reward conditions with a total reward of 1000
points divided between the modalities (0/1,000, 250/750,
etc). Because we were primarily interested in discovering
whether any effect of reward was ordered with reward size,
we used a Bayes factor approach (Jeffries, 1961; Kass &
Raftery, 1995). Using Bayes factors, it is possible to
directly test which orderings the data support. Following
the Bayesian analysis, we used ANOVAs and post hoc
comparisons to compare condition means. This analysis is
likely to be more familiar to the typical reader and, as we
will show, the results of these two analyses converge upon
the same conclusion.
Second, can these effects be attributed to the relative
amount of reward assigned to each task, as is generally
assumed, rather than the absolute amount of reward
assigned to each task? To test this, we considered the equal
high and low reward conditions (250/250 and 750/750)
from Experiment 2.
Effects of relative reward amount on attention allocation
Bayesian analysis In order to address whether performance
ordered with reward size, we fit a Bayesian hierarchical
working memory model (Morey, 2010) based on Pashler
(1988) assumptions to the data from both the auditory and
visual task. Figure 2 (upper panel) shows the posterior
mean capacities in the auditory task plotted against the
posterior mean capacities in the visual task. The intervals
are posterior standard deviations on the differences from the
no reward condition for each task. In addition to estimates
of the effects of reward, the model also provides estimates
of the posterior probability of the true orderings of the
reward effects. Because there is always uncertainty in
sampling, the observed order of the reward conditions in
our data may not be the true orderings. Our hypotheses
regard true orderings of the conditions, considered jointly
for the visual task and the auditory task. The posterior
probability of each joint ordering may be used to construct
tests of specific hypotheses regarding the allocation of
resources.
We constructed hypotheses by considering three groups
of joint orderings that might reasonably describe the
deployment of attention resources. These nested cases are
depicted in Fig. 3. The most basic theoretically plausible
case supposes that attention allocation is inflexible, such
that attention might be deployed only in an all-or-none
manner. Any ordering in which the 0-point reward
corresponds with lower estimates of capacity than all the
rewarded conditions is consistent with this possibility,
which is represented by A (Fig. 3, white region). A stronger
claim is that attention can be flexibly divided between two
stimulus sets. In that case, the payoff conditions in which
there is some reward allocated to each task should produce
capacity levels for a given task that are all higher than is
found when there is no reward for that task, and lower than
is found when there is reward exclusively for that task. Any
ordering in which the 0-point reward corresponds with the
lowest capacity estimate and the 1,000-point reward
1 We manipulated the order of the presentation of the tasks between
participants in Experiments 1 and 2, and within-participants in
Experiment 3, but have collapsed across it in all reported analyses.
Although we always observed significant effects of task order on
visual capacity estimates (such that visual capacity estimates were
higher when the visual task was presented and tested first),
auditory capacity estimates did not vary with order, and there
were no significant interactions involving both order and reward
variables (ps > .13), whether order was manipulated within or
between participants. Because the order manipulation does not
address either of our main questions, and apparently does not
impact our inferences regarding task rewards, we have chosen not
to include it in our report of the results.
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hypothesis, represented by B (Fig. 3, dark grey region).
Finally, we also considered C (Fig. 3, black region), which
included only the perfect joint ordering of capacity
estimates with reward amount in both tasks. This joint
ordering represents the strongest case for a flexible
allocation of resources.
To construct our Bayes factor tests, we first considered
all three hypotheses equally likely a priori; thus, each
hypothesis has even odds against each other hypothesis. A
Bayes factor analysis proceeds by determining the amount
by which the data change the odds of each hypothesis
relative to each other hypothesis. The Bayes factor for the
broadly flexible allocation hypothesis (B exclusive of C)
versus the inflexible allocation hypothesis (A exclusive of B
and C) was 19, meaning that the data favored the flexible
allocation hypothesis by 19 to 1, considered strong
evidence against the inflexible allocation hypothesis (Jeffries,
1961). The inflexible allocation hypothesis was rejected even
more decisively against the strong flexible allocation
hypothesis (that is, C versus A); this Bayes factor was 53,
which is considered very strong evidence. Finally, the data
substantially favored the strong flexible allocation hypothesis
over the weaker flexible allocation hypothesis (C versus B),
by a factor of 6 to 1. Overall, the data provide substantial
evidence in favor of the flexible resource allocation
hypothesis. More details about these analyses and estimation
procedures are given in the Appendix.
Task Reward in Points per Trial
Stimuli Measure 0 250 750 1,000
Relative Reward Conditions
Visual arrays
Hit rate .55 (.19) .63 (.18) .63 (.20) .61 (.20)
CR rate .73 (.18) .80 (.15) .82 (.14) .87 (.08)
Capacity 2.93 (1.94) 4.03 (2.10) 4.19 (2.37) 4.41 (1.78)
Tone sequences
Hit rate .52 (.16) .52 (.15) .55 (.19) .62 (.15)
CR rate .68 (.21) .75 (.15) .78 (.12) .76 (.13)
Capacity 1.52 (1.41) 2.00 (1.68) 2.54 (1.40) 2.91 (1.24)
Low Reward (250) High Reward (750)
Absolute Reward Conditions
Visual arrays
Hit rate .60 (.15) .63 (.19)
CR rate .80 (.10) .81 (.09)
Capacity 3.93 (1.56) 4.30 (1.95)
Tone sequences
Hit rate .56 (.17) .55 (.20)
CR rate .75 (.12) .76 (.14)
Capacity 2.36 (1.40) 2.44 (1.51)
Table 2 Hit rates, correct
rejection rates, and estimated
capacity for the visual array and
tone sequence tasks as a function
of reward condition,
Experiment 2
In the absolute reward
conditions, participants received
the same number of points for
correct responses on each task.
Mean capacity estimates were
computed with Pashler’s
formula (1988). n = 30. Standard
deviations are in parentheses
Task Reward in Points per Trial
Stimuli Measure 0 250 500 750 1,000
Visual arrays
Hit rate .56 (.17) .61 (.20) .59 (.16) .62 (.20) .67 (.18)
CR rate .69 (.18) .77 (.12) .83 (.12) .81 (.13) .84 (.12)
Capacity 2.58 (2.36) 3.92 (1.96) 3.92 (1.90) 3.98 (2.40) 4.84 (1.74)
Tone sequences
Hit rate .52 (.20) .50 (.17) .58 (.16) .56 (.17) .54 (.15)
CR rate .70 (.20) .75 (.15) .78 (.13) .78 (.14) .78 (.13)
Capacity 1.59 (2.08) 2.05 (1.17) 2.82 (1.00) 2.59 (1.21) 2.37 (1.28)
Table 1 Hit rates, correct rejec-
tion rates, and estimated capacity
for the visual array and tone
sequence tasks as a function of
reward condition, Experiment 1
Mean capacity estimates for
both tasks were computed with
Pashler’s( 1988) formula.
n = 32. Standard deviations are
in parentheses.
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the conditions with a total of 1,000 points per trial, one
on capacity estimates from Experiments 1 and 2 which
included task (auditory or visual) and reward for that
t a s k( 0 ,2 5 0 ,7 5 0 ,o r1 , 0 0 0p o ints) as within-participants
factors and another with the same factors on capacity
estimates from Experiments 1 and 3, with three levels of
reward (0, 500, or 1,000 points). In both cases,
significant main effects of task type and reward were
found and, in the analysis of Experiments 1 and 3, a
significant interaction between task and reward was
observed. Table 4 gives the details of each of these tests.
Effects of reward were always consistent with the
assumption of a trade-off; as reward to one task increased,
capacity for that task increased.
Post-hoc Newman−Keuls comparisons from both
ANOVAs suggested that trade-offs occurred and were to
some extent flexible. For the visual task, one analysis
showed that performance under all three allocations differed
from one another (i.e., 0 < 500 < 1,000 points; 0 points:
mean (M) = 2.83, SEM = .27, 500 points: M = 4.09,
SEM = .22, 1000 points: M = 4.85, SEM = .21) and the
other analysis similarly showed that both extremes (0
points: M = 2.75, SEM = .27, 1,000 points: M = 4.63,
SEM=.22) differed from each other and from the two
intermediate allocations (250 points: M = 3.98, SEM = .26,
750points: M=4.08,SEM=.30),whichdidnotdiffer,p =
.69 (i.e., 0 < 250 = 750 < 1,000 points). These analyses
provide evidence for at least three states of attention
allocation: zero, divided, and full. For the auditory task,
one analysis showed that a zero allocation produced poorer
performance than a non-zero allocation (i.e., 0 < 500 = 1,000
points; 0 points: M =1.68, SEM = .23, 500 points: M =2.65,
SEM = .12, 1,000 points: M = 2.44, SEM = .16) ; the other
analysis showed that zero allocation (M=1.56, SEM = .23)
producedpoorerperformancethan750(M=2.57,SEM=.16)
or 1,000 allocation (M = 2.63, SEM = .16), and also that a
minor allocation of 250 points (M =2.03, SEM = .18)
produced poorer performance than a larger allocation (i.e.,
0 = 250 < 750 = 1,000 points). Thus, in the auditory task as in
the visual, at least three states of attention allocation exist,
though with different cutoff points for the two modalities.
Both the ANOVAs and the Bayes factor analyses indicate that
the data are highly consistent with the assumption of a trade-
off determined by relative reward levels for accuracy in each
task, supporting at least some degree of flexibility in the
allocation of a shared attention resource.
It is worth noting that the ANOVAs are limited by the
inability to include all conditions in a common analysis.
Both the Bayesian and the traditional analyses provide
strong support for at least weak flexibility with three reward
states (Fig. 3b) and the Bayesian approach considering all
Fig. 2 Across experiments, visual array capacity estimates by tone
sequence capacity estimates. Visual arrays included eight items and
tone sequences included six items. Each data point represents
concurrent reward conditions. Capacity estimates in the upper panel
were calculated using hierarchical Bayesian techniques, with error
bars representing posterior standard deviations on the differences from
the no reward condition. In the lower panel, capacity estimates were
calculated with Pashler’s formula, collapsing across participants, with
error bars representing standard errors of the mean. For the relative
reward conditions (circles), shades correspond to reward level with
the lightest representing the highest auditory reward and the darkest
the highest visual reward. The absolute reward conditions from
Experiment 2 are represented by the light, upward-pointing triangle
(low reward) and the dark, downward-pointing triangle (high reward)
in the lower panel
Table 3 Hit rates, correct rejection rates, and estimated capacity for
the visual array and tone sequence tasks as a function of reward
condition, Experiment 3
Task Reward in Points per Trial
Stimuli Measure 0 500 1,000
Visual Arrays
Hit rate .60 (.13) .66 (.10) .69 (.14)
CR rate .68 (.17) .75 (.10) .80 (.08)
Capacity 3.15 (1.40) 4.32 (1.19) 4.87 (1.33)
Tone Sequences
Hit rate .52 (.13) .57 (.10) .58 (.12)
CR rate .69 (.13) .73 (.09) .73 (.10)
Capacity 1.81 (1.07) 2.42 (0.80) 2.53 (1.05)
Mean capacity estimates were computed with Pashler (1988) formula
for estimating capacity. n = 24. Standard deviations are in parentheses
466 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:458–472of the data together suggests that there may indeed be
stronger, more finely graded flexibility (Fig. 3c).
Even though a large trade-off is apparent between these
conditions, it does not seem to be the case that participants
ignored the 0-reward task entirely. Although performance
on the unrewarded task was low, it was consistently above
chance. This, of course, could occur on the basis of
memory that is automatically rather than effortfully
encoded or if participants were motivated partially by
factors other than the monetary reward.
Effects of absolute reward
Are the relative reward assignments causing participants to
allocate their attention to one task at the expense of the
other, as dual-task logic assumes, or are participants simply
trying harder in the higher-reward task because of the
absolute amount of reward in that task? Possibly, the
amount of resources used is not constant, but is instead
greater during blocks that include high-reward trials (e.g.,
1,000 points for either task) than during blocks with
mediocre rewards for both tasks. This question can be
examined by comparing conditions in which the reward for
both tasks is the same, both low or both high. If
performance levels are higher with more overall reward, it
suggests that part of the reward effect in other conditions
may not be due to the allocation of attention to one task
versus the other after all, but rather to the absolute reward
for each task. To our knowledge, this control has never
before been considered in an analysis of the effect of
reward on attention allocation. In Experiment 2,t w o
absolute reward control conditions were included to test
whether participants allocate attention differently when
both tasks are worth the same low (250 points) or high
(750 points) amount. To answer this question, we again
used a Bayesian approach (we also report an ANOVA).
The hypothesis test of interest is whether there is
evidence that the two equal reward conditions (250/250
and 750/750) yield different performance. To test this
hypothesis, we took a nested models approach and
compared the fit of a model in which an effect of reward
level (250/250 or 750/750) is allowed, versus one in
which this effect is constrained to be 0. For this
comparison, it is most convenient to use the deviance
information criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, &
van der Linde, 2002). Although the Bayes factors for the
discrete hypotheses tested in answering our first question
were straightforward to compute, Bayes factors for point-
null hypotheses are difficult to compute for complex
models. The DIC is an appropriate alternative for model
testing. DIC is a penalized-likelihood criterion similar to
AIC (Akaike, 1974) and BIC (Schwartz, 1978); models
with lower DIC values are preferred. The model with no
reward effects yielded a lower DIC (17,949.3) than the
model including reward effects (17,953.5), which favors the
null hypothesis that absolute reward value does not greatly
affect capacity estimates.
Likewise, a two-way ANOVA with task and absolute
reward condition (low or high) as factors revealed only a
main effect of task domain [F(1, 29) = 21.75, MSe = 4.08,
η
2
p = .43]; absolute reward amount [F(1, 29) = 0.79,
p = 0.38, η
2
p = .03] and the task by reward interaction
[F(1, 29) = 0.38, p =. 5 4 ,η
2
p = .01] were both non-
significant. Though another two-way ANOVA including
all of the reward conditions from Experiment 2 revealed a
significant main effect of reward, post-hoc Newman–
Keuls tests again uncovered no significant differences
A. Inflexible hypothesis:
No reward < Some reward
B. Flexible (weak) hypothesis:
No reward < Some reward < Full reward
C. Flexible (strong) hypothesis:
  0 < 250 < 500 < 750 < 1000
All possible orders
Fig. 3 Nested groups of orderings designated for Bayes factor
analysis. The group a included joint orderings in which capacity in
the 0-point reward condition was lower than for any other reward
amount. b included joint orderings in which the 0-point reward
resulted in the lowest estimates and the 1,000-point reward resulted in
the highest estimates, and c included only the perfect joint ordering, in
which capacity estimates always corresponded to reward value.
Hypothesis tests were always between these groups, exclusive of
each other
Table 4 Task by reward ANOVAs
Experiments 1 and 2 (Rewards: 0, 250, 750, 1,000 points)
df F MSe ηp
2
Task 1, 61 57.40* 5.98 .49
Reward 3, 183 22.75* 2.45 .27
Task × Reward 3, 183 2.04 2.43 .03
Experiments 1 and 3 (Rewards: 0, 500, 1,000 points)
df F MSe ηp
2
Task 1, 55 87.37* 2.67 .61
Reward 2, 110 37.39* 1.90 .41
Task × Reward 2, 110 7.99* 1.876 .13
Experiment 1 n = 32, Experiment 2 n = 30, Experiment 3 n =2 4
*p < .05
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between the high and low absolute reward conditions and
the intermediate relative reward conditions in either task
(ps. 3 3– .87). These analyses both suggest that, for both
the visual array and tone sequence tasks, the value of the
reward alone had no effect on capacity estimates. It
therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the differences
observed in the relative reward conditions were due to
resource trade-offs and not merely to increased motivation
during blocks with higher reward values.
General discussion
Using payoffs to manipulate volitional attention allocation
and a novel Bayesian ordering analysis for hypothesis
testing, our research contributes to ongoing discussions of
the nature of attention allocation to working memory tasks.
First, we have verified two assumptions about volition that
are commonly made with respect to working memory
performance, but have not to our knowledge been directly
measured: (1) that a trade-off between visual-spatial and
auditory-temporal memories occurs with manipulation of
rewards as well as with manipulation of task difficulty, and
(2) that the outcome of a payoff experiment is not only the
result of changes in overall motivation between conditions.
Our results were consistent with the assumption that some
constant, limited resource is divided between the two tasks,
and furthermore suggest that such a resource can be divided
flexibly, not only shared in an all-or-none manner. This
knowledge should lead to better specification of how the
sharing of resources in working memory should be
described. The vagueness with which these resources have
been described in the past limits any researcher’s ability to
clearly falsify hypotheses about resource-sharing in work-
ing memory. We think that our findings, if applied to
theories, will help to address this problem.
The studies reported above largely replicate previous
findings by Morey and Cowan (2004, 2005) manipulating
reward for task performance instead of task difficulty, but
provide three important clarifications to their previous
work. First, cross-domain interference cannot be attributed
to any unknown, obligatory priority assignment to one task
or stimulus type over the other; if this were the case, then
we might not have observed an effect of reward consistent
with the assumption of a trade-off. Second, the cross-
domain interference Morey and Cowan documented was
not due only to interference between verbal and visual-
spatial stimuli, since the present studies show interference
between tone and visual-spatial stimuli. Finally, our
evidence is consistent with the proposition that a shared
resource can be flexibly divided between two stimulus sets.
This resource could be used to store information directly as
Cowan (2001, 2005) and Oberauer (2002) suggest, possibly
in the form of the episodic buffer of Baddeley (2001), or it
could reflect the contribution of something like the central
executive proposed by Baddeley (1986, 2007). Our data do
not allow us to conclude that one of these constructs is
superior to the others, but instead establish new limits and
possibilities about what theorists may reasonably claim any
shared resource does.
The psychological literature includes some impressive
cases of successful multi-tasking, such as auditory
shadowing while playing the piano or engaging in a
visual memory task (Allport et al., 1972)a n dr e a d i n g
while taking dictation (Hirst, Spelke, Reaves, Caharack, &
Neisser, 1980). Although we have observed a trade-off
between two concurrent tasks, our results also suggest that
shared resources can be divided, at least to some degree.
These extreme cases of excellent multi-tasking might be
explained as well by a flexibly-divisible shared resource
as by separate, independent resources (for a detailed
analysis, see Cowan, 1995). Note also that this impressive
multi-tasking was not necessarily cross-modal or cross-
domain, so positing separate resources for stimuli from
different domains does not necessarily explain these
instances sufficiently.
Rather than suppose that there are multiple attention
resources distinguished by reliance on a particular sensory
domain (Wickens, 2002), it is possible to suppose that some
other difference between the two tasks enabled their
simultaneous completion. In the study of Hirst et al., even
though the tasks both involved verbal stimuli, it is plausible
that dictation may rely more on an automatic phonological
store while the semantic processing needed for reading
comprehension relied primarily upon a central attention
resource. This explanation would be consistent with the
process-based view of interference described by Marsh,
Hughes, and Jones (2009), who showed that meaningful
irrelevant speech does not equally interfere with all verbal
tasks, but instead selectively interferes with a categorization
task more than with a serial recall task. Furthermore, in
these cases, participants were experts in at least one of the
task’s domains (e.g., piano-playing, dictation-taking),
which might have enabled them to perform that task
somewhat automatically, with little reliance on a shared
attention resource. All things considered, a shared attention
resource that can be flexibly divided seems at least as
plausible as separate attention resources, and is a more
parsimonious proposition.
Even so, it seems unlikely that all resources in working
memory are shared between visual-spatial and auditory-
verbal materials. We believe that the strongest versions of
single, cross-domain models are probably inadequate, as are
the strongest versions of multiple, domain-specific resource
models. If memory were accomplished solely by a domain-
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item-to-item trade-off between items from concurrent
stimulus sets, regardless of their domain. Here, we do not
observe an item-to-item trade-off between visual-spatial
and tone items, although there is clearly a cost for both
tasks; the cost of one visual item was worth about 0.5
acoustic items. One possible explanation for this is that we
did not include masks to eliminate lingering sensory
memories; Saults and Cowan (2007) showed in a similar
procedure that this was necessary to observe item-to-item
trade-offs. Therefore, in our studies, reliance on a shared
resource might have been somewhat reduced compared
with the studies of Saults and Cowan. Auditory-verbal
stimuli benefit more from automatically-activated echoic
memory more than visual stimuli benefit from iconic
memory (Darwin, Turvey, & Crowder, 1972), and the
results of Saults and Cowan appear to confirm this. This
factor might generally force a greater reliance on a central
resource in visual, but not the auditory, tasks. This
proposition is consistent with our data, in that the variance
in capacity estimates with reward amounts was greater for
the visual than the auditory task, as might be expected if
participants can rely more on auditory than visual sensory
memories to make a decision.
Gopher and Donchin (1986) suggested three possible
interpretations for data that fit neither a strong separate
resources nor a strong central resource model: (1) that one
or both tasks are at ceiling, or are data-limited in Norman
and Bobrow’s( 1975) terms; (2) there is a marginal divided
attention cost, i.e., with less total usable resource in a
divided-attention situation than in a full-attention situation;
or (3) there is partial overlapping demand for a common
resource. We argue that, in this case, the third explanation is
most plausible. Performance levels on both the visual array
and the tone sequence tasks were safely below ceiling level.
Although we cannot truly test whether a there was a cost for
dividing attention (because we have no data from pure
single-task conditions), performance in the 1,000-point
reward conditions was comparable to single-task perfor-
mance observed in other studies (Cowan et al., 2005).
Moreover, a divided-attention cost alone cannot explain the
existence of three states of attention allocation in both
modalities. The reason for supposing a partial overlapping
demand for a common resource is that the central store
might be supplemented by sensory memory, phonological
and visuo-spatial memory (Baddeley, 1986), and/or activated
elements of long-term memory (Cowan, 1988).
Others have suggested that concurrent tasks may draw
upon one attentional resource that can be rapidly switched
between tasks (e.g., Alvarez et al., 2005). Our results
cannot confirm or falsify an attention-switching account; it
is a potential direction for future studies of cross-domain
resource sharing in working memory, but a challenging one,
inasmuch as it is difficult to distinguish empirically
between resource switching and resource sharing when
trade-offs are observed. Thus, it is possible that participants
in our studies allocated attention on an all-or-none basis on
each trial, and that our observation of flexible division
actually reflects a different mixture of all-or-none states in
each combination of reward conditions. This unresolved
question is analogous to the question of whether capacity
limits themselves occur because of concurrent attention to
the items (Cowan, 2001) or one-at-a-time processing of a
limited number of items repeatedly on a rapid time scale
(Lisman & Idiart, 1995). Just as capacity limits are of
interest without resolution of this tough issue, it is
theoretically important that we observe a flexible trade-off
between tasks, regardless of whether that trade-off occurs
within individual trials or only in the balance between
trials.
The relation between working memory storage and a
more general attention resource used in other phases of
processing in working memory also warrants further
study. Fougnie and Marois (2009) found that, when two
visual working memory tasks are presented together, the
encoding and responding processes are unaffected,
except when the storage capacity limit interferes with
further encoding; also, Woodman and Vogel (2005)
showed that, although consolidation of new items can
occur while other items are being stored, the number of
items that can be consolidated is limited by the amount of
working memory capacity remaining. Both Fougnie and
Marois and Woodman and Vogel ultimately argue that
general attention processes, which are typically found to
be involved in encoding and retrieval, are not used for
visual working memory maintenance. Theoretically, one
could extend that suggestion to the present study, but only
if a working memory store that is shared between
modalities is separate from attention. This suggestion is
consistent with Baddeley’s division of the central execu-
tive, a processing resource, from the episodic buffer, a
domain-general store. However, it is not currently known
whether this possible dissociation of general attention
processes from storage in visual working memory tasks
also holds for situations in which both visual and auditory
or verbal representations must be maintained.
While our results are consistent with the division of a
shared store or some shared attentional resource, we believe
that at least it might be possible to use attention to boost
fragile memories, in order to prevent over-writing (Cowan
& Morey, 2006) or to delay the complete loss of complex
representations in short-term memory (or “sudden death” as
Zhang and Luck 2009 call this particular forgetting
phenomenon). This role for attention could theoretically
occur as refreshing, thought to be a non-automatic
executive function (Raye, Johnson, Mitchell, Greene, &
Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:458–472 469Johnson, 2007). One difficulty with the suggestion that
storage must be domain-specific and does not depend on
attention is that it does not explain why the maintenance of
items in a visual array is impaired by performance of a tone
identification task that does not depend upon working
memory storage (Stevanovski & Jolicoeur, 2007). One
possibly reconciling speculation is that storage in working
memory does not necessarily depend on attention, but
nonetheless benefits from the application of it. This topic is
certainly one that requires further consideration.
The present studies extend and clarify previous obser-
vations of cross-domain interference (Morey & Cowan,
2004, 2005; Stevanovski & Jolicoeur, 2007). Previous
research clearly suggested the necessity of including some
shared resource, perhaps even a shared memory store
(Cowan & Morey, 2007; Saults & Cowan, 2007) in models
of working memory. Our findings limit the nature of that
shared resource, suggesting that it can be flexibly allocated
between two stimulus sets.
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Appendix
Bayesian hierarchical analysis details
In this appendix, we outline the details of the Bayesian
hierarchicalanalysisusedtoarguefortheflexibleallocationof
resources. A detailed description of the hierarchical model
may be found in Morey (2010), along with simulations
showing that it outperforms traditional analyses. Model
details and GUI software (WoMMBAT: Working Memory
Modeling using Bayesian Analysis Techniques) used to
obtain model estimates can be freely obtained from
drsmorey.org/research/rdmorey/.
In order to obtain Pashler (1988) capacity estimates in a
hierarchical model, linear models are placed on two
parameters: working memory capacity (ĸ) and the logistic
transform of guessing probability (G). The logit function is
used to transform the guessing parameters from (0,1) to the
set of real numbers, in a manner similar logistic regression.
Let i = 1,...,86 index participants, j = 1,2 index the order in
which the auditory and visual tasks were performed, and
k = 1,...,5 index reward conditions. Then, the capacity and
guessing parameters for the i th participant, for the j th
order, in the k th reward condition is
kijk ¼m k ðÞþ h1i þ h2j þ h3k
logit Gijk

¼mðgÞ þ gijk
where μ
(κ) and μ
(g) are the grand mean capacity and
guessing parameters, η1, η2, η3 are the random effects of
participant, order, and reward condition, respectively, and γ
is a random effect on guessing. The model above was fit to
both the auditory and visual change detection data, yielding
two sets of effect estimates. Details on priors and the
specific methodology used to obtain estimates may be
found in Morey (2010). One important detail is that the
prior distribution on each of the effect parameters is the
same; there is no a priori bias toward any particular
ordering of the reward effects.
The main question we want to address regards the
ordering of the reward effects, indexed by the five η3
parameters. The output of the hierarchical analysis is a
chain of vectors, each one of which is a sample from the
joint posterior distribution of the parameters (see Rouder
&L u ,2005, for a tutorial for psychologists). To determine
the posterior probability of any particular ordering of
reward condition effects, we observe the order of the η3
parameters on each iteration of the chain. The proportion
of times each ordering appears in the chain is an estimate
of the posterior probability of that ordering. The posterior
probability of a joint ordering is obtained by multiplying
together a posterior probability of an ordering in the
a u d i t o r yt a s ka n da no r d e r i n gi nt h ev i s u a lt a s k .S u m m i n g
the posterior probabilities of joint orderings in a group of
orderings yields the posterior probability of that group of
orderings. In order to compute the Bayes factor of one
hypothesis to another, the ratio of posterior probabilities of
the two hypotheses is divided by the prior probabilities.
The Bayes factor thus represents the proportional change
in the odds of one hypothesis to another due to observing
the data.
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